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This paper empirically investigates the role of trade, remittances, and institutions in 
economic development in a large sample of developing countries using recently developed 
instruments for all these variables. Both cross country (over 30 years) and dynamic panel 
data (over 5-year periods) regressions of growth rates on instrumented trade, remittances, 
and institutions provide evidence of a significant impact of trade, institutions, and 
remittances on growth. While institutions foster growth, remittances hamper it. The effect 
of trade on growth is positive in cross sectional regressions but ambiguous in dynamic 
panel data regressions. These results are indicative of a more important role for trade in 
explaining growth in the very long run than over shorter horizons.  
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1- Introduction 
What are the fundamental determinants of per capita income growth? For long, many 
economists have attempted to answer this question. Although there is still an on-going 
debate on the answer, most economists refer to institutions, openness, and remittances as 
some of the main factors affecting economic growth. 
There is a long and distinguished line of literature that places institutions at the center of 
analysis. In this respect, institutions, especially in the form of property right protection and 
less distortionary policies, affect incentives to invest to achieve desirable economic 
outcomes (North 1990). This has been supported by econometric results presented in 
many recent empirical papers, such as Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2001), and 
Rodrik et al. (2004). 
The second school of thought put emphasis on the role of international trade as the main 
conduit of economic development. Influential papers in this school include Sach and 
Warner (1995), Frankel and Romer (1999), and Dollar and Kraay (2003). In these papers, 
trade strongly fosters economic convergence among countries and regions. 
The third group of explanations focuses on remittances or the flow of cash that overseas 
working migrants send back to their home country. There is a considerable debate 
regarding the contribution of remittances to economic development in developing 
countries. The positive view conjectures that remittances help improve recipients’ 
standard of living, encourage households’ investment in education and healthcare. 
Remittances are also necessary for financing imports, which is good for the balance of 
payment. However, opponents of remittances persist that remittances fuel inflation and 
reduce incentives to work, which are obviously harmful for growth. Empirical studies on  2
economic impact of remittances also produce mixed results (see, for examples, Glytsos 
2002, Leon-Ledesma and Piracha 2004, and Chami et al. 2005). 
The above picture suggests the three possible factors which determine how successful 
countries are in creating higher income levels. This paper focuses on the extent to which 
institutions, trade openness, and remittances explain about the variation of economic 
growth across countries and on investigating if they are complements or competitors in 
economic development. To this end, a sample of aggregate data on trade, remittances, and 
institutions from 67 developing countries for over 30 years (1970-2000) is collected. This 
sample has an advantage of offering large cross-sectional variation. Unlike most of the 
papers in the literature using a levels framework, for example, measurement errors and 
omitted variable bias, this study chooses a growth framework for its regressions. This 
framework serves several purposes. First, it helps avoid potential problems of the levels 
framework as indicated by Dollar and Kraay (2003). Second, it accounts for the 
conditional convergence story as projected by the Neo-classical growth synthesis (through 
the inclusion of the initial income variable). However, when this paper draws together the 
three strands of literature to look at the partial effects of trade, remittances, and institutions 
on growth, it confronts with a fundamental identification problem. Countries that have 
good economic performance often seem to have better institutions, trade more with others, 
and receive relatively less remittances (measured by the size of GDP). This endogeneity 
problem has been stressed in the literature (see, for example, Dollar and Kraay 2003, 
Chami  et al. 2005). To overcome this problem, this study employs popularly-used 
instruments for all trade, remittances, and institutions. Also, to make the results more 
informative about the relative importance of the three factors in the long-run, this paper 
estimates both cross-sectional regressions and panel dynamic regressions.  3
When estimating the partial effects of trade, remittances, and institutions on growth using 
cross-sectional data, this paper finds that ordinary least squares regressions of log 
difference of real per capita income on trade shares, remittance shares, and measures of 
institutional quality deliver statistically significant coefficients on all variables. When all 
these interested variables are instrumented using the instruments used intensively in the 
literature, it is found that the obtained coefficients of these variables are even larger (in 
terms of magnitude) as compared to previous ordinary least squares results. This indicates 
that all these factors are important in predicting growth in the long run: trade and 
institutions foster growth, but remittances hamper it. Although there may exist 
multicollinearity in the second stage regressions, this problem is not so severe. 
This paper next turns to the increase in growth in developing countries over the last three 
decades to see how much growth can be explained by improved institutional quality, 
greater trade volumes, and changes in remittance flow. To this aim, it estimates dynamic 
regressions of 5-year changes in log level of GDP per capita on its lagged variable, log 
difference of trade shares, log difference of remittance shares, and difference in measures 
of institutional quality using a dynamic panel data technique. To control for possible 
reverse causation from growth to changes in trade, remittances, and institutions, this paper 
utilizes lagged log levels of these variables as their instruments. Results obtained indicate 
a strongly significant and economically relevant effect of changes in trade, remittances, 
and level of institutional quality on growth. In other words, there is enough evidence of 
the important roles of these factors in both long and short run.   
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Sections 2 documents the cross-sectional 
evidence on trade, remittances, and institutions. Section 3 presents results of the dynamic 
regressions. Section 4 ends the paper with some concluding remarks. Detailed variable  4
description, data sources, and list of countries in the sample can be found in the 
Appendices at the end of the paper. 
2- Remittances, trade, institutions, and growth in a cross-section of countries  
This paper starts by examining the effects of trade, remittances, and institutions on per 
capita income growth in a cross-section of countries. To capture growth performance of 
countries, the log-difference of per capita GDP is regressed on measures of international 
market size, remittance inflow, and institutional quality: 
00 1 02 3 4 log log log log log iT i i iT iT iT iT iT YY Y T S R S I X αα α α α ε −= + + + + + Δ +          (1) 
where  iT Y  is real GDP per capita at year T ,  0 i Y  is real GDP per capita at the beginning of 
the period,  iT TS  is the trade–GDP ratio,  iT RS  is remittances-GDP ratio,  iT I  is the quality 
level of institutions, and  iT X  is a vector of other explanatory variables.   
In this study, the growth framework is chosen ahead of the levels framework, which is 
used extensively in the literature, to capture the conditional convergence effect (through 
the log of initial income) which is often found in empirical growth models, either Neo-
classical models, e.g. Mankiw et al. (1992), or models of international technological 
transfer, e.g. Dowrick and Rogers (2002).
1 An additional advantage of this approach is 
that it helps overcome two problems of the levels approach, as indicated by Dollar and 
                                                 
1 The economic intuition behind is the steady state distribution of income levels.  As shown in Mankiw et 
al., if economies are not in their steady states, the transitional dynamics of the Neo-classical model are 
captured by the addition of the ‘initial’ income level in a growth regression. If economies are in their steady 
states, the addition of the lagged dependent variable should add no explanatory power.  5
Kraay (2003), which cause endogeneity through reverse causality and omitted variable 
bias.
2 
 There is a voluminous number of existing papers that examine the effects of institutional 
quality on level of per capita income such as Hall and Jones (1999), Kaufmann et al. 
(1999), Acemoglu et al. (2001), Dollar and Kraay (2003), and Rodrik et al. (2004). 
Frankel and Romer (1999) use the levels framework to estimate the effect of trade 
integration on growth. Meanwhile, Chami et al. (2005) and Catrinescu et al. (2006) 
investigate the impact of remittances on economic development borrowing the growth 
framework. All these suggest a good case for the importance of the above mentioned 
factors on a country’s economic performance. Apparently, property right protection and 
fair enforcement of contracts can affect the incentives to invest/work and innovate. In 
addition, the access to international trade and remittance income may also affect these 
incentives and, hence, growth. 
To measure the quality of institution, this paper employs the aggregate index of economic 
freedom of the Fraser Institute (Gwarteny and Lawson 2007). This composite indicator, 
which draws on survey data from the Global Competitiveness Report and the International 
Country Risk Guide, measures the extent to which institutions in a country provide secure 
protection of property rights, assure fair enforcement of contracts and a stable monetary 
environment, allow free exchange with foreigners, and lift restrictions on entry into 
occupations and business activities. It is computed for 123 countries in the base year of 
2000, and, by construction ranging from 0 to 10 where 10 implies the highest institutional 
quality. This paper recognizes several other available measures of institutional quality in 
the literature, for example, the composite index by Kaufmann et al. (2003), the anti-
                                                 
2 In addition, from equation (1), it can be easily shown that the levels regression is nested within the growth 
regression. Hence, the growth framework is more general than the levels framework.  6
expropriation index by Acemoglu et al. (2001) and the rule of law index by Rodrik et al. 
(2004). However, these data sets have a very limited time-series dimension which can 
hardly be used for panel estimation. As a result, the economic freedom index is chosen for 
its wide range of coverage, long time-series dimension, and broad scope of definition.
3 
This paper measures real GDP per capita for the period 1970-2005 in 1990 dollars using 
data from the United Nations Statistics Division. Human capital, the only control variable 
used in this paper, is proxied by fraction of adult population completing post-secondary 
education from Barro and Lee (2000) database. Trade openness is measured by total trade 
as a fraction of GDP. These data come from Summer, Heston, and Bettina’s Penn World 
Tables version 6.2. Finally, data on remittances are collected from the International 
Monetary Fund Balance of Payment Statistics Yearbook and the World Bank’s Migration 
and Remittances Datasets.
4 
Table 1 provides results estimated by simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for 
a cross-section of countries in the period 1970-2000. In the first column, average growth 
of GDP per capita is regressed on the logarithm of initial GDP per capita level in 1970 and 
on the logarithm of education variable. In the next columns, each time, one variable on 
trade openness, remittances, and institutions is added separately and finally added all 
together in the regressions. It can be seen that the coefficient on initial income term is 
always negative and highly significant which confirms the convergence story of the Neo-
                                                 
3 Recently, Marshall et al. (2008) construct Polity IV data on qualities of democratic and autocratic authority 
for 162 countries over the period 1800-2006. This data set measures key issues such as qualities of executive 
recruitment, constraints on executive authority, political competition, and changes in the institutionalized 
qualities of governing authority. Although this data set is focused more on the political side than the 
economic side of institutions, it is a potentially good measure of institutional quality for future research on 
the issue.   
4 It is necessary to stress the poor quality of data on remittances. This is due to the fact that large quantities 
of international remittances are transmitted through various unofficial channels such as friends, family 
members and are, therefore, not recorded in the balance of payments of many countries. As a result, 
unofficial figures may underestimate the actual flows of remittances.   7
classical growth school of thought. Similarly, the impact of education on growth is 
positive and significant. This result supports theories of growth in which human capital 
generates significant technological externalities as per Lucas (1988) and is also in line 
with empirical evidence by Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) among others. Turning to the 
variables of interest, it is found that the signs of trade openness and institutions are as 
expected, positive, and statistically significant. Throughout the table, the coefficients on 
remittances enter negatively and statistically significant or close to being so. This supports 
the perception of the remittance opponents who content that remittances could have a net 
harmful impact on national economic growth because they have the potential to fuel 
inflation, disadvantage the tradable sector by appreciating the domestic currency, and 
reduce incentives to work as receiving households can opt to live off of foreign transfer 
rather than by working. Overall, results obtained indicate that countries with stronger 
institution, more integration (in trade), and lower inflow of remittances are likely to grow 
faster. 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
However, as discussed extensively in the literature, there are some potential problems with 
the OLS regressions of this kind. The first one is the endogeneity of the interested 
variables due to reverse causality. Countries may have good institutions because they are 
rich (the ‘halo effects’ as per Dollar and Kraay 2003) and rich countries tend to trade 
more. In addition, as remittances are more likely a compensation for unfavorable 
economic conditions, such as low output, poor countries tend to receive large amount of 
remittances relatively to their GDP. The second problem is the likely measurement error  8
of subjective institutional quality.
5 To address these problems, this paper employs a two-
stage least squares (2SLS) estimation procedure using instruments used previously in the 
literature. In order to preserve as large a sample as possible, this paper uses legal origin 
and the religious composition of the population (percentages of Catholics, Protestants, 
Muslims, and other religions) as suggested by La Porta et al. (1999) as instruments for 
institutions. These instruments are intended to capture the impact of colonial origin on 
institutional quality.
6 Acemoglu et al. (2001) suggest settler mortality as an appealing 
instrument but this is only available for a smaller number of countries in the sample 
considered in this study. To instrument trade, this paper uses Frankel and Romer (1999) 
measure of fitted values of trade predicted by a gravity model. As for remittances (as share 
of GDP), following Chami et al. (2005), this paper instruments the variable by income gap 
with the US. These instrumental variables have been demonstrated to perform fairly well 
in the sense of producing strong second stage results (e.g. Acemoglu et al. 2001, Dollar 
and Kraay 2003, Glaeser et al. 2004, Chami et al. 2005). The results of the two-stage least 
squares estimates are reported in Table 2. 
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
Panel A of Table 2 presents all regressions undertaken in Table 1, however, using an 
instrumental variable (IV) technique. All regressions include an unreported constant. It is 
found that all variables are significant in the intuitive direction. While trade and 
institutions affect growth positively, the impact of remittances on growth is always 
negative. The coefficients of trade share, remittance share, and institutions in the IV 
                                                 
5 There is also some concern about the potential endogeneity of the education variable. However, when 
performing the Hausman test for the exogeneity of this variable, this paper can not reject the hypothesis that 
the variable is exogenous at usual confidence levels (p-value = 0.131). 
6 La Porta et al. (1999) classify the theories of determinants of institutional performance into three different 
groups: economic (the efficiency view), political (the redistribution view), and cultural (the trust or beliefs 
view). Accordingly, they suggest per capita income, legal origin, and religious affiliations as three important 
determinants which capture these three dimensions of the quality of institutions.  9
estimations are generally larger (in absolute value) than in the corresponding OLS 
estimation. This suggests that the endogeneity problem cause great bias in the OLS 
estimates. All regressions confirm the importance of institutions, trade openness, and 
workers’ remittances in explaining the cross-countries variation in development.
7  
It can be seen that the main findings of Frankel and Romer (1999) and Dollar and Kraay 
(2003) also hold in this sample. Per capita GDP growth is highly and positively correlated 
with access to foreign markets (measured by trade as a share of GDP), especially in 
regressions (5) and (8). Results in column (2) say that an increase in the log of trade share 
by one unit leads to an increase in growth by 17.9 percent over 30 years or roughly 0.6 
percent per annum. In column 3, it is found that remittances exert a negative impact on 
growth with an estimated coefficient of -0.230. This means that if log of remittance share 
increases by one unit, income growth will be lower by 23 percent in 30 years or 0.76 
percent a year. This result supports the findings of Chami et al. (2005). The positive role 
of institutions to economic performance as found in many previous papers, such as 
Acemoglu et al. (2001), and Rodrik et al. (2004), is also confirmed in this paper as in 
column 4. Here, a unit (positive) shock to the institutional quality equation results in an 
increase in income growth of 58.7 percent over 30 years which is equivalent to 1.93 
percent annually. To examine the partial effects of trade, remittances, and institutions, this 
paper combines these specifications in the rest columns of the table. Regressions in these 
columns provide significant coefficients with intuitive signs on all the interested variables. 
The first-stage regressions as reported in panel B also offer interesting results. In all first 
stage regressions, while the lagged income variable does not show significant impact, 
                                                 
7 Although results are not reported here, a test of overidentifying restrictions for the institutional variable is 
run for each set of estimates (since there are more than one instruments used for this variable). As the test 
fails to reject the null hypothesis of no overidentifying restrictions, it supports the choice of instruments in 
this paper.  10
education has positive effects on trade volume, remittance inflow as share of GDP, and 
institutions. The finding about the positive role of education is in line with the Glaeser et 
al. (2004)’s view that better education system leads to more benign polity, more dialogue 
than violence, more law and order and democratic accountability, and more political 
stability. It also confirms that more human capital enables countries to benefit more from 
trade. In addition, the hypothesis that higher level of education will give (migrant) workers 
working overseas better opportunities to find higher income jobs and then send more 
money back home is supported by results of this paper. Besides education, there are other 
factors that influence interested variables. In the first-stage regression for trade share, 
fitted trade instrument has a significant coefficient. In the specification for remittance 
share, legal origin, fitted openness, and income gap with the US all strongly predict 
remittances. Meanwhile, only legal origin has strong explanatory power for institutions. 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
Table 3 illustrates the relationships among openness, remittance inflow, and institutions. 
Trade, remittances, and institutional quality are separately regressed on income at the 
beginning of the period and education and on each other. The way of instrumenting the 
endogenous variables is the same as before. While it is possible that there exist non-linear 
relationships among these variables, this paper tries to keep the specifications as simple 
and linear as in all baseline specifications. The OLS regressions indicate that trade 
openness exerts a significant and positive impact on remittances but remittances do not 
significantly affect trade. Like trade, remittances do not significantly induce institutions. 
The impacts of institutions on remittances and trade are insignificant. In the IV 
regressions, institutions do not significantly affect trade and remittances and are not 
affected by these factors either. However, trade and remittances are found to have a  11
significant and positive effect on each other. This confirms the remittance supporters’ 
view that remittances may be a good source of finance for imports and to some extent, 
trade and remittances are complementary in economic development process. However, the 
overall impact of remittances on economic performance is found to be negative as in Table 
2. Results in Table 3 indicate that there may be multicollinearity among these variables 
although it is not so severe.
8 The highest value of R-squared in the first stage regressions 
is 0.399 (in the trade equation) points out that there is no perfect linear relationship among 
the right-hand side variables in the second stage regressions of the instrumental variables.  
To get more informative results about the roles of trade, remittances, and institutions, it 
may be better to make use of a dynamic framework. This will be addressed in the section 
below. 
3- Remittances, trade, institution, and growth in a dynamic framework 
 In Section 2, cross-sectional regressions showed that very long-run growth is significantly 
affected by the changes in the intensity of trade and remittances and the level of 
institutional quality. A disadvantage of those cross-sectional regressions is that it is 
difficult to separate the pure effects of those variables from potential unobserved factors 
that explain differences in growth rates across countries but vary very little with time such 
as geographical or climate conditions. To overcome this limitation, in this section, a 
dynamic framework relating growth rates of real GDP per capita over time to changes in 
variables of interest will be utilized. For a start, the following cross-country regression is 
considered: 
01 2 3 4 log log log log it i it k it it it it t it YY T S R S I X αα α α α γ ε − =+ + + + + Δ + +             (2) 
                                                 
8  Columns (5) and (8) indicate that trade becomes significant whenever remittances variable is also 
considered.  12
where  0 i α  is a country fixed effect that does not vary over time,  t γ  is a period effect that 
is common across countries, k  is the number of years lagged (which is chosen to be equal 
to 5 in this paper), and others are as previously denoted. While the inclusion of the country 
specific effect helps pick up omitted time invariant country characteristics such as 
geographical factors, the period specific effect will pick up omitted shocks happened in all 
countries similarly, like the ups and downs or the business cycle of the whole world.  
Similar to Dollar and Kraay (2003), this paper employs the estimation technique 
developed by Caselli et al. (1996) which transforms the level regression in equation (2) to 
regression in differences as follows: 
() () ( ) 12 2 3 log log log log log log log log it it k it k it k it it k it it k Y Y Y Y TS TS RS RS αα α −− − − − −= − + − + −
 
                              () ( ) () () 4 it it k it it k t t k it it k II XX αγ γ ε ε −− − − +− + Δ −+ − + −                      (3) 
This transformation presents a regression of growth of output on its own lag and on 
growth of different explanatory variables. This dynamic framework offers many desirable 
features in terms of addressing measurement errors, omitted variables, and endogeneity 
problems (Dollar and Kraay 2003). 
By focusing on changes in growth rates over different 5-year periods, it is expected to get 
more informative results about the partial effects of changes in trade, remittances, and 
institutions on growth. It is assumed that while trade volumes, remittance flow, and 
institutional quality may be correlated with the contemporaneous and lagged shocks to 
GDP growth, they are uncorrelated with future shocks to GDP growth. This implies that 
the 5-year lags of trade, remittances, and institutional quality can be used as instruments in 
growth regressions. It has been suggested that when estimating panel data regressions with 
lagged dependent variable and fixed effects, the results are subject to an estimation bias,  13
especially when T  is small. To avoid this bias, this paper employs the generalized method 
of moments (GMM) for dynamic panel data in which the differencing transformation 
above is an important first step to obtain regression results.
9 
Table 4 and 5 presents regression results using the first differenced GMM technique 
mentioned above. This paper starts with an unbalanced panel of 229 observations on 
growth in 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005 for about 49 countries. 
The dependent variable is the log difference of income per capita, which captures the 
average annual growth if it is divided by 5, and the explanatory variables include a lag of 
the log difference of income per capita, log difference of education, log difference of trade 
as share of GDP, log difference of remittances as share of GDP, and level difference of 
institutional quality. All regressions include an unreported time dummy. 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
Table 4 shows the results which are estimated by least squares method. Although this 
estimation method is inconsistent and its results should be treated with caution, it helps to 
depict the partial correlations in the data. It can be seen that remittance share, trade share, 
and institutional quality are all strongly correlated with growth.  
Of more interest are results shown in Table 5 where all the variables are instrumented as 
described above. Coefficients on trade share, remittance share, and institutions are all 
statistically significant and have smaller magnitudes as compared to the least squares 
results. Interestingly, the trade variable does not always show positive impact on growth. 
It has a negative coefficient in equation (2) when it stands alone. There is a qualitatively 
                                                 
9  The author would like to thank an anonymous referee for this useful comment.  14
similar result when remittances variable is also considered in equation (5). However, the 
coefficient on trade becomes positive in equation (6) when institutional quality is 
introduced and in equation (8) when all interested variables are examined simultaneously. 
It is quite striking that the estimated coefficient on trade variable varies dramatically 
across specifications, ranging from -0.305 to 0.294. 
Remittances are found to have a significant negative effect on growth throughout all 
regressions. The largest (negative) impact is found in equation (3) when the variable 
stands alone (without trade and institutions being considered). However, the magnitude of 
its coefficient is reduced somewhat when trade and institutional variables are taken into 
account. 
The institutional variable always enters the regressions positively and significantly. Its 
coefficient varies from 0.083 when both trade and remittances are simultaneously 
examined in equation (8) to 0.095 when only remittances variable is introduced in 
equation (7). 
In short, dynamic panel regression results strongly confirm the effective role of changes in 
trade, remittances, and institutions to economic growth as found previously in cross-
sectional regressions. While the impact on growth of institutions is persistently positive, of 
remittances is persistently negative, the impact of trade on growth is somehow ambiguous.    
The first-stage regressions for changes in trade, remittances, and institutions in Table 6 
provide interesting results. Human capital does not necessarily lead to institutional 
improvement, which is inconsistent with the view that high human capital growth leads to 
faster institutional improvement. This may be due to some mean reversion in the measure 
of institutions given a relatively short horizon of 5 years. There exists a negative  15
relationship between previous trade volumes and subsequent changes in trade. This result 
can be explained by the fact that many developing countries opted for protectionist 
measures to protect their domestic production which results in reduction in trade volumes, 
especially in 1960s and 1970s (Dollar and Kraay 2003). This result holds even when 
previous institutional quality level and previous remittance share are added to the 
regressions. The main purpose for adding those two lagged variables to the regressions is 
to see whether the outcomes of trade, remittances, or institutions come first. If one factor 
comes first then its lagged value should strongly predict changes in the others. It can be 
seen that the previous values of institutional and remittances variables enter positively, 
however, insignificantly. 
(Insert Table 6 about here) 
Changes in remittances also have a negative correlation with its previous value. In the 
contrary to the results reported in Table 2 and 3, lagged trade volumes do not have strong 
explanatory power for remittances. The rate of change in institutional quality is negatively 
correlated with its previous value. This reflects the somehow persistency in institutional 
economic policies. While the lagged level of trade has very strong explanatory power for 
changes in institutional quality, which is consistent with the argument of Rodrik (2000), 
the lagged level of remittances exerts an insignificant impact on institutions. In short, 
results obtained in Table 6 suggest that the relationship between trade, remittances, and 
institutions may be mutually bidirectional. 
4- Conclusions 
This paper tries to explain the dynamics of income in the last 30 years in which initial 
income term (in cross-sectional data) is incorporated to control for historical factor. In a  16
large cross-section of countries, it is found that in the long-run, growth is strongly 
correlated with high level of trade and better quality of institutions but with low level of 
remittances. This suggests that trade, remittances, as well as institutions are all important 
in understanding differences in growth rates across countries in the long run. 
Over shorter periods of time, results obtained, to a certain extent, lend strong support to 
the above conclusion. Given that the lag of income per capita growth and the rate of 
change in educational level are controlled for, 5-year average growth exhibits substantial 
persistence with the variation in remittances and institutions. The only exception is that 
changes in trade share do not give an unambiguous prediction of changes in growth rates 
(the coefficient on trade is sometimes positive and sometimes negative). These imply that 
trade affects growth more significantly in the longer run than in the shorter run. An 
explanation for this outcome is as follows. In general, trade is strongly linked with 
common geographical and historical issues. The longer the time period is considered, the 
better the combined effects of trade with those issues on economic performance are 
revealed. Trade is also often affected by short-run fluctuations in exchange rate, interest 
rate, etc. However, those short-run movements do not necessarily lead to changes in 
growth as it may take longer for growth to respond.    
As trade may positively affect institutions, which in turn affects growth, it can be drawn 
from this result that as a policy maker, one needs to formulate appropriate policies which 
can strengthen both institutional quality and trade liberalization. To this end, countries 
should adopt policies and an institutional structure that assure effective enforcement of 
contracts and fair regulation of credit and labor, and allow free exchange with foreigners. 
While the positive role of trade and institutions towards growth has been, to some extent, 
established in the literature, the impact of remittances on growth, whether it is hampering 
or enhancing, is still controversial. The fact that the results of this paper somehow support  17
the hypothesis that remittances might not be a stable source of capital for development 
because it can reduce recipients’ economic incentive to work and participate in the labor 
market which results in a net harmful effect on growth is a challenging finding. If it is 
true, it is hard to think about appropriate policies to limit its adverse effect on growth 
without a more thorough analysis of the relationship between remittances and economic 
development. Because it is just the beginning of telling a story, it is expected to have more 
research works devoted to this interesting topic in the future.  18
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Table 1- Remittances, trade, institutions, and growth: OLS regressions (cross 
section) 
Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth 
Explanatory 
variables 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 


















































Log Trade Share    0.309
** 
(0.127) 
































Observations  67  67 67 67 67 67 67 67 
2 R  
0.140  0.221 0.167 0.198 0.274 0.255 0.248 0.328 
Adjusted  2 R  
0.113  0.183 0.127 0.160 0.227 0.207 0.199 0.273 
All regressions include an unreported constant. White corrected standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at the 1, 
5, and 10 percent levels are denoted respectively by ***, **, and *. 
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Table 2- Remittances, trade, institutions, and growth: 2SLS regressions (cross 
section) 
Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth 
Explanatory variable  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A: Second stage regressions (Dependent variable is GDP per capita growth) 















































Log Trade Share    0.179 
(0.222) 

































Observations  67  67 67 67 67 67 67 67 
 
Panel B: First stage regressions for endogenous variables (Trade Share, Remittance Share, and Institution) 
  Log Trade Share  Log Remittance Share  Institutions 



























































Observations  67 67 67 
2 R  
0.399 0.384 0.332 
Adjusted  2 R  
0.316 0.299 0.240 
All regressions include an unreported constant. White corrected standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at the 1, 
5, and 10 percent levels are denoted respectively by ***, **, and *. 
 
  22
Table 3- Relations among trade, remittances, and institutions (cross section) 
  Log Trade Share  Log Remittance Share  Institutions 
Panel A: OLS estimates 































Observations 67  67  67 
2 R  
0.131 0.193  0.293 
Adjusted  2 R  
0.074 0.141  0.247 
 
Panel B: Second stage IV estimates 
  Log Trade Share  Log Remittance Share  Institutions 






























Observations 67  67  67 
All regressions include an unreported constant. White corrected standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at the 1, 
5, and 10 percent levels are denoted respectively by ***, **, and *. The first stage IV estimates are the same as those 





Table 4- Remittances, trade, institutions, and growth: least squares regressions (panel 
data) 
Dependent variable: 5-year average GDP per capita growth 
Explanatory 
variables 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Average GDP per 
capita growth in 





















Average change in 
previous 5 years of: 
         
























Log Trade Share    -0.377
*** 
(0.064) 

































Observations  276  276 276 229 276 229 229 229 
2 R  
0.471  0.517 0.524 0.482 0.553 0.531 0.515 0.553 
Adjusted  2 R  
0.455  0.500 0.508 0.461 0.537 0.510 0.493 0.530 
All regressions include an unreported time dummy. White corrected standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at 
the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels are denoted respectively by ***, **, and *. 
Table 5- Remittances, trade, institutions, and growth: GMM regressions (panel data) 
Dependent variable: 5-year average GDP per capita growth 
Explanatory variable  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Average GDP per 
capita growth in 
























Average change in 
previous 5 years of: 
         





















Log Trade Share    -0.305
*** 
(0.053) 

































Observations  276  276 276 229 276 229 229 229 
All regressions include an unreported time dummy. White corrected standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at 
the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels are denoted respectively by ***, **, and *.   24




5-year change in Log Trade Share  5-year change in Log Remittance Share  5-year change in level of Institutions 
Explanatory variable  (2) (5) (6) (8) (3)  (5)  (7) (8) (4)  (6) (7)  (8) 
Average GDP per capita 






























Average change in 














































  -0.089 
(0.071) 








Log Remittance Share 5 
years before 
  0.006 
(0.007) 


















Institutions 5 years 
before 




















Observations  276 276 229 229 276  276  229 229 229  229 229  229 
2 R  
0.285 0.288 0.276 0.277 0.119  0.124  0.122 0.123 0.251  0.275 0.251  0.283 
Adjusted  2 R  
0.261 0.261 0.242 0.240 0.089  0.090  0.081 0.079 0.220  0.242 0.217  0.247 
All regressions include an unreported time dummy. White corrected standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels are denoted respectively by ***, **, and *. 25
Appendix 1- List of developing countries included in the analysis 
Algeria Dominican  Republic
*  Kenya









  Peru 
Barbados







*  Rwanda 
Benin









*  South Africa
* 
Brazil
*  Guinea-Bissau Myanmar
*  Sri Lanka
* 
Cameroon





























     
Note: * indicates that a country is included in the panel data sample.  26
Appendix 2- Data sources and definitions 
Variable Description  Source 
GDP per capita 
growth (1970-
2005) 
Calculated for 81 countries using logarithmic formula 




Log GDP per 
capita 
Natural log of real GDP per capita   United Nations 
Statistics Division 
database 
Log Education  Natural log of fraction of adult population completing 
post-secondary education 
Barro and Lee 
(2000) 
Log Trade Share  Natural log of total trade (exports plus imports) as 










The World Bank 
Institutions  Index of Economic Freedom of the World by Fraser 
Institute which includes the following: size of 
government, legal structure and property rights, 
access to sound money, freedom to exchange with 




Law legal origin 
Dummy variable taking value 1 if the law system of 
the country originates from English Common Law 
and 0 otherwise 
La Porta et al. 
(1999) 
Catholic  Fraction of population chooses Roman Catholic as 
the religion 
La Porta et al. 
(1999) 
Protestant  Fraction of population chooses Protestantism as the 
religion 
La Porta et al. 
(1999) 




Natural log of constructed openness calculated by 
fitting actual trade share in a bilateral trade equation 
(gravity model) taking into account the influence of 
geographic factors  
Frankel and 
Romer (1999) 
Income gap  The absolute value of the difference between GDP 
per capita of a country with GDP per capita of the US 
United Nations 
Statistics Division 
database 
 